THE FALL 2014 TERM IN REVIEW
The fall 2014 term concluded on Tuesday, November 25th. The Supreme Court issued 45 signed opinions, many of them directly involving civil cases or having an impact on some aspect of civil practice. Here are a few of the highlights:
The End of Per Curiam Opinions
State v. McKinley, No. 13-0745, was a first-degree murder case that ordinarily wouldn’t have garnered any attention from a civil litigator. However, the Court used McKinley as a vehicle to abolish its practice of issuing per curiam opinions.
Per curiam opinions were unsigned and were used to apply old, settled principles of law. Through the years, there was considerable confusion over how per curiam opinions were to be cited and what weight they carried. Furthermore, the new Rules of Appellate Procedure, which became effective in January, 2010, introduced yet another form of written decision--i.e., a memorandum decision. In light of these developments, the Court opted to eliminate per curiam opinions entirely. The Court also noted that all of its written decisions may be cited as authority although, of course, the precedential authority of memorandum decisions “is necessarily more limited.”
Three Wins for Homeowners
Three cases were decided that advanced the rights of homeowners in West Virginia.
In Brooks v. City of Huntington, No. 13-1083, the Court was asked if there was a cap on the amount of repair costs that could be recovered as a result of damage to a person’s home. Recognizing the unique nature and value of a personal home, the Court concluded that all reasonable repair costs could be recovered--even when the cost of making the repairs exceeded the home’s fair market value.
The Court also revised the law governing deficiency judgments so as to favor homeowners. In Sostaric v. Marshall, No. 14-0143, the lender bought the home through foreclosure proceedings and then sued the homeowner for the deficiency. Even though the lender paid $60,000 for the home, it was probably worth considerably more. The homeowner wanted to prove the home’s true value and receive a full credit. Even though Fayette County National Bank v. Lilley, 199 W.Va. 349, 484 S.E.2d 232 (1997) would have prevented this, the Court voted 4 to 1 to overrule Lilley.
The third case was Quicken Loans, Inc. v. Brown, No. 13-0764, which was on appeal for the second time. There were many issues addressed in the Supreme Court’s opinion, some of them involving nuances in West Virginia’s consumer law, the appellate rules, and the Court’s prior mandate. However, the Court spent nearly 30 pages reviewing the trial court’s award of punitive damages. In the end, the Court concluded--as it did before--that Quicken was guilty of intentional, reprehensible conduct that supported a large punitive damage award. Indeed, the Court concluded matter-of-factly: “This is not a close issue.” Considering all of the aggravating and mitigating factors, the court found that the plaintiffs were entitled to nearly $2,200,000 in punitive damages.
Rehearing of the Jail Rape Case
In the spring, 2014 term, the Supreme Court found by a 4-1 vote that the Regional Jail Authority was immune from any liability for a series of rapes committed by one of its corrections officers. West Virginia Regional Jail & Correctional Facility Authority v. A. B., No. 13-0037. The Court then took the extraordinary step of granting a rehearing. There was an expectation that the Court might reverse itself, or might at least rewrite its syllabus points in a way that would make it possible for rape victims to obtain relief under some circumstances. However, the Court’s new opinion issued on October 30 made no change in the outcome. According to Justice Davis, the Court missed “a golden opportunity” to right a wrong and to update our governmental immunity law.
It’s a Dog’s Life
Although the decision itself will probably have very little impact, no case heard during the fall term prompted more opinions and more emotions than Robinson v. City of Bluefield, No. 13-0936. Robinson raised a straightforward issue of statutory construction--i.e., did municipal courts have the power to order destruction of a vicious dog. However, the justices found themselves diving headlong into a debate over the proper balance between the rights of dog owners and the rights of those who may be injured by a vicious dog. By a 3-2 vote, the Court concluded that circuit courts and magistrate courts have the power to order the destruction of a vicious dog, but municipal courts do not.
